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The objective of this final year project was to develop a device to gather measurement data 
from an air quality sensor in a database over the Internet. The device was to be an add-on 
for the already existing sensor without having to change any components of it. The sensor’s 
firmware was also required to be updated remotely. This thesis and the application that was 
developed is a part of a larger project including a database server for gathering data and a 
web application for displaying the gathered data.  
 
The platform for the device was an Atmel microcontroller with a Debian Linux operating 
system. One part of the project was enabling a secure connection between the sensor client 
and the server. When sending measurement data over the Internet security aspects regard-
ing data integrity and authenticity had to be taken into consideration. Another part of the 
requirements of this project was updating the sensor’s firmware remotely. A program was 
developed for this purpose. Converting the firmware file from Intel Hex into binary form and 
utilizing the sensor’s proprietary communication protocol were the challenges faced when 
writing the software.  
 
The developed device met the set requirements and is able to communicate securely and 
to upload new firmware to the sensor. This project was a good learning experience regarding 
information security and autonomously functioning embedded devices. 
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Insinööriyön tavoitteena oli kehittää laite, jolla kerätä ja lähettää ilmanlaatuanturin tuottamaa 
mittausdataa palvelimelle Internetin välityksellä. Laitteen tuli olla lisättävä osakokonaisuus 
jo olemassa olevan anturin yhteyteen, ilman että anturin kokoonpanoa tarvitsee muuttaa. 
Anturin ohjelmiston etäpäivittäminen oli myös yksi vaatimuksista. Tämä insinöörityö oli osa 
isompaa projektia, jossa osakokonaisuuksina on palvelin, jolle mittausdata kerätään, sekä 
verkkosivusto mittaustulosten esittämistä varten. Laitteen alustana toimii Atmelin valmis-
tama mikrokontrolleri, johon asennettiin Debian Linux -käyttöjärjestelmä. Yksi osa projektia 
oli yhteyden luominen anturin ja palvelimen välille. Mittausdataa lähetettäessä Internetin vä-
lityksellä piti ottaa huomioon tietoturva-asioita datan eheyden ja luotettavuuden suhteen.  
 
Toinen osakokonaisuus tässä projektissa oli anturin ohjelmiston päivittäminen, jota varten 
kirjoitettiin ohjelma ohjelmistotiedoston formaatin muuttamiseksi ja anturiin lataamiseksi. 
Ohjelman luomisessa oli haasteena Intel Hex -tiedostomuodon ymmärtäminen, ja anturin 
oman tiedonsiirtoprotokollan käyttäminen.  
 
Projektin päättyessä laite vastasi sille asetettuja vaatimuksia ja kykenee tietoturvalliseen lii-
kennöintiin ja lataamaan anturille uuden ohjelmiston. Projekti oli hyvä oppimistilaisuus tieto-
turvaan ja itsenäisesti toimivien sulautettujen laitteiden toimintaan liittyvistä asioista. 
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Abbreviations 
NB-IoT Narrowband Internet of Things, a new NB radio technology to address the 
requirements of the IoT 
LTE Long-Term Evolution, mobile phone communication standard 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications, mobile phone communication 
standard 
Nelix Unit that polls the air quality sensor for measurement data locally through 
ModBus. Running Linux OS 
TCP Transmission control protocol 
USB Universal serial bus 
JSON JavaScript Object Notation 
SSH Secure Shell 
SCP Secure copy, a tool provided with SSH 
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
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1 Introduction 
The goal of this project was to add network connectivity to a sensor that measures quan-
tity and mass of particles in air. The sensor can be interfaced with a PC, but only locally. 
This project started from the need to remotely and wirelessly gather data from the sensor 
to a remote database with an integrated device. Wireless connectivity provides ability to 
form a network of sensors to monitor air quality on multiple measure points over a wide 
area. By gathering the measurement data to a database, a comprehensive analysis can 
be made of the air quality in that area.  
During the sensor’s operational lifetime, its settings, calibration values and firmware need 
to be updated. The most convenient way to achieve this is remotely over an Internet 
connection. Wirelessly transferring data over an insecure network produces challenges 
with data security and integrity. To solve this, the security aspects needed to be evalu-
ated and appropriate security measures implemented in the system. 
This thesis focuses on two topics, creating a secure connection between the sensor and 
the database server and the program Armupdate that updates the sensor’s firmware. 
Armupdate also handles a file format conversion from Intel ASCII Hex into binary. An 
Atmel SAMA5D4 series microcontroller was used to interface the already existing sensor 
through a ModBus/TCP interface. A 3G radio modem was installed in the microcontroller 
to gain reliable internet connectivity. A Linux Debian operating system was installed in 
the microcontroller for a practical way to handle files and to utilize the connection pro-
vided by the modem. This microcontroller unit is later referred to as Nelix. Reading the 
measurement data from the sensor is not one of the main topics in this thesis. 
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2 Internet of Things 
The Internet of things, or IoT, is a fairly recently popularized term used to describe a 
network that does not require human interaction to gather data or send messages. In 
automotive industry sensor networks have been commercially available since the 1980’s 
but only fairly lately data from these networks is sent over the internet for failure statistics 
and optimized maintenance plans [1]. The growth of IoT is thought of to be able to pro-
vide new services and new features on top of existing ones. Examples of IoT are being 
implemented in building automation and logistics services improving effectiveness and 
thus reducing costs. 
2.1 New Network Technologies for IoT 
Most IoT applications only need a small amount of bandwidth but require to have low 
power consumption in operation. As millions of IoT devices are expected to be in opera-
tion during the next ten years, new technologies are being developed solely for IoT ma-
chine-to-machine type operations [2]. 
Members of the Third-Generation Partnership Project decided in September 2015 to 
standardize a new radio technology narrowband Internet of Things, NB-IoT, also referred 
to as LTE-M2. It is targeted towards enabling the connectivity of machine-to-machine 
devices over a Wide Area Network. NB-IoT is designed to improve indoor coverage, 
support a massive amount of connected devices and to reduce end device power con-
sumption. One major benefit of NB-IoT is the ability to utilize existing LTE and GSM 
frequency bands which should ease the deployment of the technology. In September 
2016 Nokia together with Sonera tested the NB-IoT network technology in Finland trans-
ferring temperature, humidity and barometric pressure sensor data. [2;3.] 
A French company called Sigfox utilizes its own proprietary low power wide area network 
technology for low power and low data throughput devices. The Sigfox network operates 
on unlicensed frequency ranges employing Ultra Narrow Band, UNB technology. Maxi-
mum bandwidth with Sigfox at 100 bits per second is even lower than with NB-IoT but is 
still enough for applications where the amount of data to be transferred is minimal. Low 
bandwidth allows for minimal power consumption with standby times which can be tens 
of years. [4;5.] 
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2.2 Security Concerns 
With devices affecting and monitoring physical surroundings, potential attacks are no 
longer targeted solely on data or services but also privacy and physical security. [6] Baby 
monitors and digital video recorders with Internet access have often times poorly pro-
tected access control. One cause is the end user not changing the default password for 
their account but also the audio and video stream can be without any sort of encryption, 
resulting in a major privacy breach. [7.]  
Some attacks benefit from the interconnectability of devices. If one of the devices in a 
Local Area Network or Controller Area Network has access to the internet and is 
breached through that connection, it should not provide access for the attacker to the 
rest of the devices on the network. A prime example of this is remotely controlling a Jeep 
Cherokee described in the paper Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehi-
cle by Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek. Through the car entertainment unit that is con-
nected by a CAN bus to the rest of the on board computers, Miller and Valasek were 
able to control the cars accelerator, brakes and steering. [8.]  
IoT devices having access to the Internet and therefore having an IP address have be-
come a target for bot net creators. Bot net is a network of devices infected with software 
that is most often used for denial-of-service attacks. With thousands of infected devices, 
the bot net is able to attack a host by creating massive amount of service requests, 
overloading the target’s resources and thus denying the service for even the legitimate 
users. For example, the Mirai malware infected hundreds of thousands IoT devices in 
2015 by scanning for devices with factory default user name password combinations. 
[9;10.] 
2.3 Secure Boot 
One main topic in IoT security is the ability for the system to autonomously check for 
unauthorized software modifications. Secure boot is a procedure that enables a device 
to verify the authenticity of the application code before execution. Verifying the applica-
tion before execution provides protection against  a large amount of security breaches. 
Malware infected or otherwise modified software will not be launched. The application 
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code is verified by a root-of-trust program that is stored on a read-only-memory and ex-
ecuted on start up before starting the application. This operation takes place each time 
the device is powered on and thus does not protect from changes in the application that 
could happen during run time. The root-of-trust program must be stored in a non-modifi-
able memory such as ROM or internal flash memory that can be by other means assured 
to be modifiable only by an authorized party. [11.] 
For the root-of-trust program to be able to verify the application code, the code must be 
digitally signed by the issuer of the application. The signature consists of a hash calcu-
lated from the application code which is encrypted using the private key of the signing 
party. The root-of-trust program verifies this signature by decrypting the hash from the 
signature with the public key of the signing party and calculating a hash from the appli-
cation code. These two hashes must match for the application code to be considered 
valid. The public key of the signing party must be stored on the device in a non-modifiable 
memory so that it cannot be modified by any unauthorized party. The public key should 
also be protected by a checksum for integrity verification. Updating the software on a 
root-of-trust based system requires the new software to be also signed appropriately with 
the private key of the signing party. [11.]  
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3 Security and Cryptography 
For a network to be considered secure it must guarantee confidentiality and that only 
known users are able to send and receive messages without anyone else accessing the 
content of the messages. The network must guarantee integrity of messages, making 
sure that they are free of alteration by unauthorized users or by technical malfunction. 
Users of the network must be able to prove their authenticity so that their messages can 
be proven to be from a certain origin and it must be impossible for unauthorized users to 
masquerade themselves as someone else. [12.] 
3.1 Confidentiality with Encryption 
Confidentiality in practice is achieved with encryption, which is a process where the con-
tent of the message is converted into a ciphertext. Even if a third party has access to the 
media and therefore to the message, they are unable to determine its content from the 
encrypted message. The algorithm used in the conversion process is known as a cipher. 
The secrecy lies in what algorithm is used and this information must be somehow shared 
between endpoints through another secure channel. Maintaining different ciphers unique 
for each user is practically impossible with any larger networks. To overcome this down-
side most ciphers use keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. With keys the secrecy is 
transferred from knowing the cipher to knowing the correct key. A single algorithm can 
be used but the key is the shared secret between endpoints. Symmetric key ciphers use 
the same key for encrypting and decrypting the message. Both endpoints must know this 
key before being able to communicate and thus again creating the need of sharing the 
key through an alternative secure channel beforehand. [12.] 
Asymmetric key ciphers use two keys, one to encrypt and another to decrypt the mes-
sage. Encrypting and decrypting with different keys is usually done by utilizing a trapdoor 
one way function where the outcome of the function for a chosen value is easy to calcu-
late but reversing the operation is difficult. In cryptographic context difficult means that it 
takes an unfeasible amount of computing time to reverse the operation. In theory any 
encryption can be decrypted without knowing the key if given infinite resources and time. 
As asymmetric keys use two keys, the encryption key can be public. Only the decryption 
key must be kept secret. This again leads to the dilemma of sharing the decryption key 
but in most cases this only needs to be done once. When initializing a connection with 
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the aim of using a symmetric key cipher, within the first steps information of the cipher 
or key must be sent before the channel is secured. This enables any potential attacker 
to also know what cipher or key will be used. With asymmetric keys, the first message 
sent can be encrypted with the public encryption key. Only the targeted recipient of the 
message has the correct decryption key; therefore, the attacker is unable to determine 
any contents of the message. Asymmetric ciphers are also referred to as public key ci-
phers as the encryption key can be public. [12.] 
3.2 Integrity 
If a third party has access to the media and is able to send and receive encrypted mes-
sages, they cannot access the content but can still modify the messages. This way se-
curity is not compromised but the service is most likely unusable depending on the out-
come of the modification after the message has been decrypted. One-way hash functions 
are used in cryptography to ensure message integrity. Typical for a one-way hash func-
tion is that it takes a variable length input and the result after conversion has a fixed 
length. The function’s output is a hash that is used as a checksum when sent along with 
the message. By agreeing what hash function to use, both endpoints can calculate the 
hash from the message and come to the same end result.  
Properties of a good hash function include that it is unfeasible to invert, meaning that it 
is next to impossible to recreate the message from the hash by trying all possible results. 
It is also desirable that a small change in the message leads to a big change in the hash 
to protect against transfer errors. In most scenarios a potential attacker would want to 
change only a small part of the message. Another desirable feature is that two different 
messages should never result in the same hash. This to ensure that an attacker cannot 
completely change the message and still being able to maintain a correct hash. If an 
attacker is able to modify the whole message, they are most probably also able to create 
a totally different hash. This situation then becomes an authentication issue which is 
described in chapter 2.3 Authentication and digital signatures. It is also possible to cal-
culate the hash not only on the message content but also including the shared secret 
between the sender and receiver. As the attacker does not have the key, they cannot 
create a hash for the message. [12.] 
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3.3 Authentication and Certificate Authority 
Authentication is a concept that ensures that a node in the network is who they claim to 
be. There are two main approaches in cryptography to ensure authentication, digital sig-
natures and challenge response queries, both of which utilize asymmetric encryption 
with public keys. Challenge response queries consist of a random number that is sent to 
the node that is requesting authorization. The receiving node signs this random number 
with its private key and sends the signed response back to the other node. The other 
node can then decrypt this signature with the according public key and authenticate the 
node. This challenge can be repeated the other way round so that both nodes are certain 
of each other’s identity. With digital signatures, a part of the message is encrypted with 
the private key. The receiver can decrypt this signature with the claimed sender’s public 
key and confirm its authenticity. This method differs from public key encryption by the 
fact the encryption is done with the private key instead of the public key. Digital signa-
tures are also often used with file transmissions to prove that the file is the same unal-
tered version as the provider claims it to be. [12.] 
In the usual scenarios where public keys are used to authenticate nodes in the network, 
the public key is presented and proven to be authentic with challenge response queries. 
This does prove that the node has the correct private key and thus is the owner of the 
said public key, but there is no certain link between the identity of a user or node in the 
network and their key pairs. Public key authentication has a possibility for man-in-the-
middle attacks if Node A does not know the identity of Node B and is unknowingly com-
municating with node X. Certificate authority is a third party whose only task is to keep a 
record which public key belongs to whom. The certificate authority issues a certificate 
which proves that the target of a certificate is known by the certificate authority. When 
Node A in the network wants to connect to Node B, it requests the target node’s public 
key from certificate authority. Certificate authority returns the public key encrypted with 
its own private key. Node A can be certain that the public key for Node B is authentic as 
long as the certificate authority is trusted. All nodes in the network need only to know the 
public key of the certificate authority instead of knowing all keys for all other users in the 
network. [12;13.] 
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4 System Description 
The key hardware components used in this thesis are the particle sensor and the Atmel 
SAMA5D4 series ARM based embedded microprocessor unit illustrated in figure 1, with 
a 3G modem. The Atmel microprocessor unit was used with an evaluation platform that 
had all the necessary connections and interfaces for application development. The 
server into which the measurement data was gathered and the web application for dis-
playing the data is not described in this thesis.   
 
Figure 1. Atmel SAMA5D4-XULT evaluation kit. Copied from Atmel [14]. 
The air quality sensor unit has two interfaces for communication, a USB and an Ethernet 
port. The USB port utilizes the proprietary USB protocol for communicating with a pro-
prietary software on a PC made for interfacing the sensor. With this software, all the 
sensor unit's functionalities are accessible, including reading measurements, setting new 
calibration values and uploading new firmware. In this project’s application, the sensor 
was interfaced through the Ethernet port as illustrated in figure 2. The air quality sensor’s 
Ethernet port supports both ModBus/TCP and the proprietary packet protocol. The Mod-
Bus/TCP bus is used for reading the sensor’s holding registers which holds all the meas-
urement data and possible error and status codes. The proprietary packet protocol over 
TCP is used for firmware updating. The Atmel microprocessor unit together with Linux 
operating system is later referred to as Nelix. 
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Netta
Pegasor Urban Air 
Quality Sensor
ModBus for reading measurement data
Nelix
Atmel Embedded 
Microprocessor
3G Module Server with database
Internet
Proprietary packet protocol for firmware 
uploading
TCP
USB
EthernetEthernet USB
Figure 2. System layout diagram 
4.1 Hardware and Operating System 
The Atmel SAMA5D4-XULT is an evaluation kit for the Atmel SAMA5D4 series ARM-
based embedded microprocessor units. The evaluation kit includes all required inter-
faces for this project. The Ethernet interface was used for opening an SSH connection 
locally to the board for development and debugging purposes and in a later stage to 
communicate between the Atmel board and the air quality sensor. The USB interface 
was used for connecting the 3G modem. The modem provides wireless internet access 
for data transfer from the microprocessor to the database server. 
A Debian Linux operating system was installed to the Atmel Embedded Microprocessor 
to manage the hardware and software resources. Having an operating system enables 
the handling of the firmware image as a file and also running different programs simulta-
neously automated with scripts. All the functionalities of Nelix are driven by the main 
bash script Nelix_main.sh. 
4.2 Air Quality Sensor 
A part of the system is an air quality sensor which is designed for combustion engine 
emission monitoring and outdoor and indoor air quality monitoring. The sensor measures 
the amount of particles and mass concentration in gas. It can detect particles with size 
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ranging from a few nanometers up to 2.5 micrometers, depending on the sensor’s con-
figuration. The sensor itself requires clean and dry compressed air feed to function 
properly. At the beginning of the project, the sensor was installed in a laboratory at 
Metropolia University of Applied Sciences (UAS) with external air and moisture filters. 
Later, an all-in-one package, was installed at school premises as illustrated in figure 3. 
The unit has an air compressor and filters internally installed.  
 
Figure 3. Air quality sensor unit in operation at Metropolia UAS premises 
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4.3 Development Tools 
Development of Armupdate software was carried out in Windows environment with Vis-
ual Studio development environment. Visual Studio offers a graphical user interface for 
code editing and a debugger tool. Initial compilations and tests were run on Windows 
environment. Later the code was compiled on a target processor. A quicker way of com-
piling and testing would have been to have a cross-compiler that can compile for another 
kind of processor than the compiling host. Without a cross-compiler, the source needed 
to be transferred to the target processor and compiled there. Small modifications to the 
code were simple enough to be done on a/the target processor with a simple text editor 
such as the Unix native Vi. Bigger modifications were done on Windows for practical 
reasons and also to be able to upload the source code to Git version control. 
Valgrind is a wrapper around a collection of tools and it functions similarly to a virtual 
machine. It utilizes just-in-time compilation techniques which means that the compilation 
is done during run time. The target program is translated to a form called Intermediate 
Representation and in that form it can be analyzed with Valgrind tools. After any analysis 
or modification is done to the Intermediate Presentation form, it is translated back into 
machine code and executed on the host processor. [15.] All software that was developed 
for this thesis was analyzed with MemCheck, which is a memory mismanagement de-
tector that can detect memory leaks and misallocation errors. It was used to verify that 
there are no memory leaks in the programs. A memory leak could be fatal in a system 
that is supposed to be running continuously possibly in a remote location. 
Most of the code debugging needed to be executed on the target processor. GNU Project 
Debugger (Gdb) was used for this purpose. Gdb requires both the source code and the 
compiled binary to enable the user to step through the source code while executing it. 
Program progression and variables and their values can be examined and the program 
can be executed line by line or until a set breakpoint is reached. There are graphical user 
interfaces for Gdb but they were not an option as the only way of interfacing the Nelix 
was with command line through a network interface. 
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Wireshark is a network traffic analyzing tool that can display the data being transferred 
over a network interface. It was used to investigate what kind of commands and re-
sponses the sensor’s data interface transferred and to ensure that the software running 
on Nelix was sending the data in the right format. Wireshark can decode and identify 
most of the common communication protocols and display the headers and other fields 
of the protocols. The air quality sensor is running a proprietary protocol over the standard 
Modbus/TCP and Wireshark made analyzing and debugging this interface easy. Firstly, 
the sensor was interfaced with a desktop PC running Windows operating system and the 
proprietary configuration software. With Wireshark running on this computer it was pos-
sible to see what commands were sent from the PC and how the sensor responded.  
Later when the sensor was interfaced with the Atmel SAMA5D4 with the Debian operat-
ing system, running Wireshark was not feasible. Tcpdump is a program that is included 
as a standard package in most Linux distributions and it can save the raw data passing 
through the Atmel’s network interface to a file. The file can then be transferred to a PC 
and analyzed with Wireshark in the same manner as a locally captured log. 
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5 Secure File Transfer over an Insecure Network 
The sensor clients connect to the measurement database server over internet. To ensure 
that data that the server receives is valid, the connection needs to be encrypted and the 
sender needs to be proven authentic. This is achieved with Secure Shell (SSHl). SSH is 
a suite of tools that enables an encrypted connection between hosts. It utilizes public-
key cryptography for authentication and a symmetric shared secret for encryption. All 
traffic between the sensor and the measurement data server is initiated by the sensor 
client. This way the sensor clients do not need to respond to any potentially malicious 
inbound connection requests.  
5.1 Cryptography and Authentication 
Public-key cryptography is a cryptographic protocol system that the SSH protocol utilizes 
for client and server authentication, a proof that both parties are what they claim to be. 
Public-key encryption is also known as asymmetric cryptography as it uses a combina-
tion of two separate keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. One key is called public key 
as it is shared with the recipient of the message. The other is called private as it is kept 
secret and stored only locally on the client. The client signs a message with its private 
key and the recipient server decrypts it with the client’s public key. These two keys are 
mathematically linked, in a way that it is practically impossible to deduce the private key 
from the public key. These key pairs are only used for authentication and cannot be used 
for encrypting the connection. [12;13;16.] 
SSH utilizes symmetric encryption in order to secure the transmission of information. 
When a client initializes an encrypted connection to a server, the connection is encrypted 
with a shared secret created using Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, after the client 
has verified the server’s authenticity with public-key authentication. Typical for a Diffie-
Hellman is that both parties participate in generating the key without allowing one end to 
control the outcome of the process. Also with Diffie-Hellman, the shared secret is gener-
ated without the need of sharing the secret over an insecure connection. The generated 
key is a symmetric key, as it used to both encrypt and decrypt messages. After the con-
nection has been encrypted, the client can be authenticated to access the server. 
[12;13;16;17.] In the application described in this thesis, the authentication is accom-
plished with both public-key and a password.  
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5.2 Establishing a Secure Connection 
Establishing an SSH connection starts with the client opening a TCP connection to port 
22 on the target server. Port 22 is the default and an officially assigned port for SSH [16]. 
The connection process is illustrated in figure 4. During the first two steps, the client and 
the server exchange SSH version information and lists of supported encryption protocols. 
The encryption protocol is agreed on, based on what the client is able to support. If none 
of the protocols is supported by both parties, the connection is closed. The server also 
sends information about its identity in the form of a public key. If the host’s public key is 
not found in the client’s list of known hosts, a warning message is displayed, to inform 
that the host is previously unknown or its identity has been changed since the last con-
nection. During the fourth step, a shared secret is negotiated between hosts. The algo-
rithm used to calculate the shared secret is selected from the lists of supported ciphers 
sent at steps one and two. [12;13;17.] An encrypted communication channel is estab-
lished after step four. It is safe to send a password and other login credentials through 
this encrypted channel. 
  
3. Verify that
 <Server public key> 
is found in: 
list_of_known_hosts 
Nelix
Data
server
1.
  
Client Hello
<Version information>
<supported protocols>
Server Hello
<Version information>
<supported protocols>
<Server public key>
2.
5. Verify signature and 
that <Client public key> is 
found in:
authorized_keys 
strict-host-key-checking 
[ON]
Exchange shared secret
Diffie-Hellman algorithm4.
Encrypted transmission channel
Signature
<Signed with private key>
Password
”Admin123"
 
Figure 4. SSH connection initialization. Data gathered from Chandra and Bauer [12;13.]. 
On step five, the client creates a signature with its private key that is sent to the server. 
With the client’s public key, the server can decrypt that signature, and verify that the 
client is the actual owner of the said public key. In addition to public key authentication, 
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a password is also required. The password can be sent as cleartext as the connection is 
already encrypted by the transport layer.  Both the client and server must be running 
SSH version 6.2 or newer to be able to utilize multiple authentication methods. [13.] 
5.3 Data Transfer during Normal Operation 
During normal operation Nelix retrieves measurement data from the sensor and uploads 
it to the measurement data server. Nelix_main.sh bash script calls the measurement 
data reading program modbuspoller, which polls measurement data from the sensor 
through a TCP/ModBus interface. The script then uploads the gathered data as a JSON 
file to the measurement database server. After each upload, a new configuration file is 
retrieved from the server. This process is illustrated in figure 5. Handling the new config-
uration file is not implemented yet. The current implementation is an example of how the 
server is able to inform the Nelix unit if any new calibration parameters or a firmware 
update is available.  
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Figure 5. Flowchart diagram of bash script Nelix_main.sh 
The JSON file is uploaded to the server with Secure Copy (Scp). Scp is a tool that comes 
with SSH and it is used to remotely copy one file from one host to another [18]. When 
running the scp command, an encrypted connection to the target host is created auto-
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matically, as described in chapter 3.2 Establishing a secure connection. Multiple authen-
tication methods are used. The target server will require public-key authentication and a 
password.  
By design, SSH requires that the password is typed by an interactive keyboard user. This 
drawback that causes a challenge in automating the process is avoided by using sshpass 
to run the scp command. Sshpass makes the situation appear to SSH so that the pass-
word is typed from a keyboard instead of an automated script. [19.] Scp is used this way 
for all data transfer from Nelix, to both upload the measurement data to the server, and 
to download new configuration files or firmware. 
5.4 File Integrity Considerations  
Scp runs over the TCP transport layer protocol which employs a cyclic redundancy check 
for each packet’s integrity verification. While it does catch most errors, it cannot be con-
sidered a guarantee for file integrity. The file is transmitted as separate packets and a 
missing packet could go unnoticed resulting in a corrupted file. A corrupted firmware 
image could render the sensor inoperable. The worst case scenario would be if the sen-
sor’s communication interface would stop responding. This would have the immediate 
effect of the sensor not being able to serve measurement data to Nelix as well as causing 
Nelix to have no chance of uploading another firmware onto the sensor.  
Currently there is no extra file integrity verification implemented to the system. One way 
to overcome this risk of file corruption during transfer would be to calculate a checksum 
of the original firmware file and compare that against the downloaded file’s checksum. 
Md5sum is a program installed by default with most Linux distributions. It can calculate 
and verify 128-bit MD5 checksums of files. A 128-bit MD5 checksum is considered a 
reliable way to verify that the file transferred correctly and intact. For verifying that the 
file was downloaded from an authentic source, the MD5 has become obsolete and 
should not be used for that purpose. [12.] 
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5.5 Key Sharing Protocol 
With public key authentication there is always the dilemma of knowing who in the network 
has which key and which identity matches which key. Implementing a certificate authority 
as described in chapter 3.3 would be one solution but would require one extra instance 
the only function of which would be key management. In this project the network and the 
relation between sensor clients and the server is simple and straightforward. Sensor cli-
ents only need to communicate to one host as opposed to some other application where 
sensors would communicate with each other as well. In such a simple network as this it 
is easier to implement key management within the measurement data server. The meas-
urement data server holds a list of all the sensor clients and their public keys. Only the 
keys that are present in that list can be used to authenticate with the server. 
Each sensor node’s public key is introduced to the measurement data server before the 
actual secure connection is established. The public key itself is not required to be kept 
secret. Introducing sensor clients to the measurement data server acts as a certificate 
registration function as in the certificate authority implementation. This eliminates the 
need for the data measurement server to accept inbound connections from previously 
unknown hosts over the Internet. Sensor nodes have a private key that corresponds to 
the public key and can prove their identity with it. Public keys of sensor nodes are added 
to the measurement data server’s list of known hosts. During the development of the 
application described in this thesis, a local area network was used for key sharing, but 
any secure network would suffice.  
Nelix has a cronjob that is set to run on the first boot and it runs the shell script key_up-
load.sh (see Appendix 1) that handles the key sharing procedure. After the key uploading 
is successful, the cronjob is deleted to ensure it will not be executed again as it reserves 
several resources by constantly trying to connect to the key server. With this design, 
after the Nelix unit has been programmed in production it can automatically generate 
and upload SSH keys through a local network connection as illustrated in figure 6.  
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Figure 6. SSH key pair sharing over LAN 
Key_upload.sh script starts with the generation of the public and private SSH key pairs. 
ssh-keygen -f /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa -t rsa -N '' 
This command generates the key pairs with default settings and with an empty pass-
phrase. The private key is saved to /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa and the public key in 
/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.pub.  
The device’s MAC address is assigned to a variable with the following command: 
MAC_ADDRESS=`cat /sys/class/net/eth0/address` 
The target IP address where the keys will be uploaded to can be configured by modifying 
the IP_ADDRESS variable in the script. The script sends a ping request to the target 
server. When the ping request is successful, the generated public key is uploaded to the 
key sharing server as request parameters of the wget command. The device’s own MAC 
address is also sent to pair sensor units and keys accordingly. 
wget –spider –S "http://$IP_ADDRESS/index.php?key=$PUB_KEY" 
The key sharing server handles saving of the key and MAC address into a list as a pair. 
In this project, the MAC address was initially used to differentiate different sensor nodes 
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from each other but the sensor clients are also given a device ID which is used for client 
identification within the measurement data server. With this ID number, the measurement 
data server can maintain a list of clients, their configuration and firmware versions. Con-
nection between the key sharing server and the measurement data server is not de-
scribed in this document. 
5.6 Possible Vulnerabilities 
How the measurement data server’s identity in the form of a public key is given to Nelix 
is not defined. With this approach the client does not have a way of making sure it is 
communicating with the authentic host. Any malicious third-party could pose as the host 
to the sensor client. The client would accept this previously unknown host without any 
verification. One simple way to avoid this situation would be to introduce the measure-
ment data server to the clients during production, the same way as sensor nodes are 
introduced to the measurement data server. SSH configuration parameter StrictHost-
KeyChecking could be set to “yes” on the sensor client as well which would cause the 
sensor clients to automatically abort connections to servers that do not appear on the 
client-side list of known hosts.  
In this project’s application both public-key authentication and a password are required 
for server access. Public-key authentication alone results in a man-in-the-middle attack 
becoming somewhat impossible. The shared secret is calculated by the peers when ini-
tializing the connection, and as mentioned before, no peer can determine alone what this 
secret will be. This shared secret also includes a session identifier. In case of a man-in-
the-middle attack, the attacker has two connections and two shared secrets, one to the 
client and one to the server. In case of public-key access authentication, the client will 
send a signature to the server using its private key. This signature includes among other 
things, the session identifier. As the attacker does not have the public key necessary to 
decrypt this signature, it cannot relay it to the server. The session identifier mismatch 
between the client and the server will lead to authentication failure. [20.] 
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6 Intel Hex File Format 
Intel Hex is a file format used to present binary data as an ASCII text file. The Hex file 
consists of records, each of which contains six fields as illustrated in figure 7. The Intel 
Hex file format defines also six different record types: 
• Data Record (8-, 16-, or 32-bit formats) 
• End of File Record (8-, 16-, or 32-bit formats) 
• Extended Segment Address Record (16- or 32-bit formats) 
• Start Segment Address Record (16- or 32-bit formats) 
• Extended Linear Address Record (32-bit format only) 
• Start Linear Address Record (32-bit format only) 
For the application described in this thesis, only necessary record types required are 
Start Segment Record, Extended Segment Address Record, Data Record and End of 
File Record. Start Segment Record defines the starting address of the object file's exe-
cution. Extended Segment Address Record contains a 16-bit segment base address that 
is multiplied by 16 and summed to the Data Record’s address to form the starting ad-
dress for the data. This allows addressing up to one megabyte of address space. Data 
Record holds the data bytes that form a piece of the image to be loaded into the target 
device’s memory. End of File Record specifies the end of the object file. [21.] 
 
Figure 7. Intel Hex data record format. Copied from Intel [21]. 
Each of the above mentioned records consists of six fields as illustrated in figure 7. Each 
line starts with a 1 byte long RECORD MARK field, character ":". The second field LOAD 
RECLEN defines the length of the information or data field in bytes. This field is 1 byte; 
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thus, the maximum length for the data field is 255 bytes. The third field OFFSET is only 
used for data records and is 2 bytes long. It defines the address offset that is summed 
to the most previous Segment Address Record to form the complete address for the data. 
On other than data records, this field should be "0000". The fourth field RECTYP speci-
fies the record type of the current line and is 1 byte long. The fifth field INFO or DATA is 
interpreted according to the RECTYP field. This field is the only one with variable length. 
LOAD RECLEN being only 1 byte long restricts the INFO or DATA field length to 255 
bytes. The last field is CHKSUM and it contains the checksum for the current record. The 
checksum is calculated by summing together all the bytes in the line excluding the check-
sum and the RECORD MARK character in the beginning of the record. The final check-
sum is formed by taking a two's complement from that sum. [21.] 
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7 Description of Armupdate  
Armupdate is a program written for Nelix to handle the air quality sensor firmware update 
process. It is written in the C++ language as it offers a higher level of abstraction than C. 
C++ enables easier error handling, memory management and container classes that 
automate many of the otherwise manual operations in C. The program consists of three 
classes: ByteLine, ImageHandler and TcpConnection. Each of these classes performs a 
part of the whole process. Distributing a complex program into smaller subprograms 
helps in the development process by enabling the developer to concentrate on one small 
task instead of a whole program.  
The firmware to be updated on the air quality sensor is received to Nelix as an Intel Hex 
file. The sensor's uploading protocol requires the firmware image as binary. The hex file 
is converted to binary on Nelix before starting the uploading process. Converting Intel 
Hex file to binary is one of the operations included in the Armupdate program. Figures 8 
and 9 give an example of the firmware image before and after conversion. Note that 
figure 9 is with hexadecimal encoding which represents the numeric binary values as 
hexadecimal numbers as the actual binary data would not be human readable. 
 
Figure 8. Example of a part of firmware image in ASCII hex file format in text editor 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of a part of converted binary firmware image in text editor with hexa-
decimal encoding 
Armupdate is started with three arguments that define the target address (hostname), 
target port (port) and the name of the firmware image file (file name). Three different 
instances of three classes are created within the program as illustrated in figures 10 and 
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11. The first object created is ImageHandler which handles the firmware image conver-
sion from Intel Hex to binary. ImageHandler receives the name of the Intel Hex file as an 
instance call parameter and converts the addresses and data from that file into variables 
in dynamic memory. To convert a single data record into binary data, ImageHandler uti-
lizes an instance of ByteLine class. File format conversion is described in more detail in 
chapter 5.2 Conversion from Intel Hex to binary. TcpConnection is the object that han-
dles all the TCP connection operations necessary for communicating with the sensor’s 
interface. It receives the target connection address and port as instance call parameters 
and opens a connection with the given parameters. TcpConnection also includes mem-
ber functions which are used to send commands to the sensor. 
Argument list:
  hostname
 port
 file name
Create new object
ImageHandler
 parameter: file name
Create new object
TcpConnection
 parameter: hostname
 parameter: port
Dynamic storage:
Vector container 
storing the binary 
image data as vectors
Convert Intel 
Hex file to 
binary
Open TCP 
connection
 
Figure 10. Flowchart diagram of the first steps in Armupdate main function 
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7.1 Using Socket API for Network I/O 
Connection from Nelix to the air quality sensor unit is established with the Socket appli-
cation program interface. Originally developed as a part of the BSD UNIX operating sys-
tem, socket has become a de facto standard with adding network connectivity to UNIX 
and Linux based systems. Socket defines an interface for network input and output that 
loosely resembles the UNIX file I/O open-read-write-close paradigm. When a program 
requests a socket to be created, the operating system returns a handle to the socket that 
can be referenced by the program. [22.] A socket is created with the function socket, 
which takes three arguments as illustrated in listing 1. 
 
Listing 1. Creating a socket 
The first argument defines how to interpret the target address as IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses differ from each other. The second argument specifies the type of communica-
tion. In this case the type of communication is SOCK_STREAM which corresponds to a 
reliable stream delivery service. The third argument specifies the protocol but can be left 
empty as TCP is the only protocol that supplies reliable stream delivery service. At this 
point the socket is created without defining a destination address or port. Connecting the 
socket is not necessary for connectionless protocols such as UDP. With TCP, socket 
must be connected before it can be used. [22.] To connect the socket, function connect 
is used, as illustrated in listing 2. 
 
Listing 2. Opening a socket 
The first argument sockfd is the handle of the socket to be connected. The second argu-
ment is a pointer to sockaddr which defines an address to which the socket will be bound. 
The third argument specifies the length of the destination address in bytes. When creat-
ing a socket to utilize the TCP protocol, the connect function returns an error if opening 
a connection was unsuccessful. If using the UDP protocol, a connection is not opened 
at this point and the destination address is only saved to be used when reading or writing. 
Utilizing UDP also enables specifying the destination address on each input and output 
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operation separately. [22] Sending data to a destination address is done with the write 
function, illustrated in listing 3. 
 
Listing 3. Writing to socket 
The first argument for the write function defines the socket to be used. In this application 
the TCP protocol is used so the socket has to be connected before writing as previously 
described. The second argument buffer is a pointer that points to the data to be sent to 
destination. The third argument is the length of the buffer. The armupdate program has 
a method writeTcp that utilizes the write function. Listing 4 illustrates how different con-
tent is appended to auxString, which is an instance of a C++ String class container. The 
write function takes the buffer as a c-string, which is a pointer to an array of characters. 
The String class has a member function copy that is used to copy the contents of a C++ 
string into an array of characters. The buffer is then passed to the write function as illus-
trated in listing 3. 
 
Listing 4. Appending different fields to buffer array 
After each write operation, a response is also read from the socket as illustrated in listing 
5. The response is not used for anything but verifying that the sensor responded with a 
length more than zero bytes. No response would result in an error. 
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Listing 5. Reading from socket 
After all necessary communication with the sensor is over, the socket is closed with the 
close function. The handle for the socket to be closed is the only argument for this func-
tion.  
7.2 Firmware Conversion Classes 
ImageHandler receives a file name as an instance call parameter and opens the ASCII 
hex file for reading and reads through the file line by line. As a line is read, ImageHandler 
creates an instance of ByteLine and passes the line read as an instance call parameter. 
ByteLine parses through the received string and checks the record's type, converts and 
saves the data to the appropriate public variable. Converted addresses are saved as 
numeric values in unsigned char variables and data records are saved to a vector con-
tainer. How ImageHandler operates with ByteLine is illustrated in listing 7. 
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Figure 11. Flowchart diagram of ImageHandler and ByteLine objects 
29 
  
ImageHandler can access the ByteLine object’s data members that are set to public, 
such as start and segment address and the data vector. Another way of accessing an-
other object’s data members would be to define the “set” and “get” methods inside the 
class that would allow modifying or retrieving the variables. After a data line is read and 
processed, ImageHandler saves the data vector formed by ByteLine as a new element 
in the vector container listVector. Each data line of the converted binary image is then 
held in a vector container as a single vector as illustrated in listing 7. When the whole 
ASCII hex file is processed, a checksum of the image is calculated and written to offset 
1C in the firmware image. This image checksum is mandatory as it is required by the air 
quality sensor’s firmware loader. 
Listing 7. Snippet from Image_Handler.cpp source code 
7.3 Conversion from Intel Hex to Binary 
The Intel Hex file is an ASCII text file. Each record's data field is converted into numeric 
values and their checksum is verified before conversion. Each pair of characters repre-
sents one 8-bit value (0 - 255). Both characters are first converted into 4-bit values (0 - 
15). The most significant character's numeric value is bitwise shifted left four times before 
summing the most and least significant values together forming a single 8-bit value in 
binary format. The object ByteLine handles the single record format conversion. It re-
ceives a record read from the Intel Hex file as a string in its instance call parameters. A 
checksum of the record is calculated with the calculateChksum function and then com-
pared to the record’s last two characters as illustrated in listing 8. 
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Listing 8. ByteLine object and single record checksum verification 
All different record types are converted in the same way. Different record types are stored 
to different variables after conversion. This variable selection is done inside a switch 
case structure in which the record’s data type functions as a selector. After conversion, 
data records are saved as a vector to a vector container and addresses are saved as 
numeric values in unsigned char variables. Data record’s converted values are saved in 
a vector container using a vector class member function push_back which adds a new 
element to the end of the vector after its current last element. Push_back also increases 
the container’s size within the limits of its capacity. [23.] Selecting into which variable to 
save the converted value and passing pointers to the characters is illustrated in listing 9.  
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Listing 9. Target variable selection and passing a pointer to conversion function con-
vertCharToHexDigit 
As the Intel Hex file uses two characters as a pair to present a single 8-bit value, a pointer 
to the first character is passed to the convertCharToHexDigit function. Inside this function, 
the received pointer is incremented by one to reach the following character. The first 
character’s value is shifted left eight times because it presents the most significant bits 
in the final value. The second character presents the least significant bits. Function con-
vertCharToHexDigit utilizes another function convertAlphabeticalHexDigitToNumeric to 
resolve numeric values represented by the hexadecimal characters. This process is il-
lustrated in listing 10. 
Listing 10. Converting two ASCII characters into their respective numeric values 
Worth noticing is that as can be seen in listings 9 and 10, records are not converted to 
binary in full length. Each pointer passed to the conversion function has an offset of eight. 
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This is exactly the length of the RECLEN, OFFSET and RECTYP fields as previously 
described in listing 7, excluding the RECORD MARK byte that was removed before pass-
ing the record to ByteLine object illustrated in listing 7. 
Initially, C-type arrays were to be used in this project to store the binary-converted data 
but were later replaced with vectors. A vector is a container class type in C++ that offers 
many useful member functions. The most useful property of a container class is that its 
size can be dynamic and automatically increased whereas C-type arrays require manual 
memory reallocation and resizing. Using vectors enables an easy way of accessing the 
container's size and adding new elements. [23.] 
7.4 Update Protocol Packet Structure 
The air quality sensor utilizes another proprietary packet structure on top of TCP for 
communication through the Ethernet interface. When armupdate opens a TCP connec-
tion and sends a message to the sensor, the TCP related headers and other content 
necessary for the protocol are created automatically into the packet. Inside a TCP packet 
there is another packet with three fields, a header, a payload size and a payload. The 
packet has a 12 byte long header which consists of a 9 byte long static identification field 
and two bytes for expressing the payload size. The content of the proprietary packet is 
created in a separate method for each command. All commands are sent with a common 
writeTcp method. For security reasons the content or structure of the packet is not de-
scribed in this document. The payload can be one of the various commands that are 
used to communicate with the air quality sensor. When uploading new firmware to the 
sensor, the payload is a piece of the firmware image. 
After the firmware image conversion, TcpConnection starts the firmware loader on the 
sensor by sending the appropriate command. The flash memory on the sensor is first 
erased and then overwritten. TcpConnection then assembles the binary image from the 
vector into 1024 byte sized packets, and uploads them one at a time to the sensor’s 
firmware loader with the write flash command. After the flash is written, a restart com-
mand is sent to the firmware loader with the first and last addresses of the new firmware 
image to let the firmware loader know at which memory area the program is. While the 
communication link to the sensor is open, a keepalive command is sent every 10 sec-
onds to prevent automatic closing of the connection. 
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8 Future Development 
In its current functioning condition, the system is able to gather measurement data from 
the sensor and upload it to the server. Nelix also has a proven ability to upload  new 
firmware to the sensor. After each measurement data packet is uploaded to the meas-
urement data server, a new configuration file is downloaded. This way the server has a 
way to transmit information to Nelix even though all traffic is initiated only by Nelix. The 
file downloaded is a JSON file, although with a small modification to the nelix_main.sh 
script it could be any other file format. A convenient way would be to replace the down-
loading of a JSON with a bash script file that when executed would download the firm-
ware file and run the armupdate program to update the sensor’s firmware.  
Using a digital signature could be a way to ensure that the firmware file was received 
from the authentic host. This could be implemented using GnuPG, which is a program 
that can be used to encrypt and sign data. GnuPG, as well as SSH, uses public-key 
encryption for encryption and signatures. The server would generate a signature of the 
firmware file with its private key. The client receiving the file decrypts the signature with 
the server’s public key. GnuPG uses its own set of private and public keys. [24.] These 
keys could also be used for SSH authentication but using the same keys for both au-
thentications would invalidate the benefit of the file signature.  
In a paper called Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice, the 
authors describe the weaknesses of Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm against a 
Logjam attack. They describe that with nation state resources it is possible to break a 
1024bit cipher and recommend that keys with a bit length of less than 2048 bits not to 
be used. In the application described in this thesis, changing the key length would require  
modifying the server’s SSH configuration to only support key exchange algorithm diffie-
hellman-group14-sha1 which uses a 2048 bit long key. [25.] The key exchange method 
is selected from a list of supported methods provided by the client and server. Both ends 
must support the same method. The client must support this key exchange algorithm in 
order to be able to establish a connection to the server. Longer keys also require more 
calculation time and they are calculated in the beginning of each connection. This would 
most likely not result in any loss of performance on the system as new measurement 
data can be received from the sensor only once every ten minutes. Another recommen-
dation is using the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange to avoid any 
feasible attacks on the key. 
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8.1 Key Revocation 
In the case of one of the sensor clients being stolen or their private keys being otherwise 
compromised, a procedure for denying them access to the server must be defined. Ap-
plications where a certificate authority is used, a list of revoked keys is published at de-
fined intervals. Any application using a certificate must check within this list whether or 
not to accept a certificate as trusted. In this project there is no certificate authority imple-
mented in the traditional sense, as a similar service is implemented in the measurement 
data server as a list of known hosts as described in chapter 5.5. If the security of one of 
the sensor client becomes compromised, its access to the measurement data server can 
and must be denied by removing their entry from the list of known hosts. Along with the 
authentication keys the sensor clients also contain the address, username and password 
used to access the measurement data server. These alone do not suffice to access the 
server as long as the server denies access for the revoked public key.  
If the security of the measurement data server would be compromised the sensor clients 
would need to generate new keys as their current ones provide access to the measure-
ment data for whomever has access to the private key of the measurement data server. 
The only way to generate new keys on the sensor clients is to access them locally and 
reprogram them and use the same key sharing procedure as in production to gather the 
new public keys manually. If the sensor nodes are operating at volumes of hundreds or 
thousands, the time it takes to access all of them to manually generate new keys would 
be disastrous. An automated process for sensor client key revocation and regeneration 
would greatly reduce the down time in this sort of worst case scenario. 
8.2 Implementing a Secure Boot 
A root-of-trust implementation as described in chapter 2.3 is possible to achieve with the 
existing SAMA5D4-XULT hardware. A secure boot loader is embedded in the ROM that 
can be used to prevent loading or running unauthentic or unauthorized application soft-
ware. Implementing secure boot would improve overall security and mitigate the chance 
of a third party being able to use the hardware and network connection of the device.  
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SAMA5D4 also includes TrustZone, which is an architecture extension that allows for the 
resources to be partitioned for two operating systems. Both secure and non-secure op-
erating system share the same the hardware resources and peripherals. With TrustZone, 
the secure operating system can monitor and control the non-secure operating system’s 
resources. The secure operating system can be small and simple and the non-secure a 
fully functioning operating system with network access and other peripheral functions. 
TrustZone also includes separate Advanced Interrupt Controllers and DMA controllers 
for both secure and non-secure access. [26.] 
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9 Conclusion 
The project described in this thesis started as wireless connection functionality to be 
added to a standalone air quality sensor. Methods and tools changed along with the 
requirements and when the device was specified to be running an operating system, the 
ability to update the sensor’s firmware became feasible. At first, writing a program to 
convert a file from a format to another seemed very difficult but ended up being quite a 
straightforward operation. Understanding the structure of the Intel Hex file format was 
challenging with all its complexity. Another goal of this project was to create a way to 
securely send data from a remote location to a server over the internet. This proved to 
be very challenging considering all the security related topics that needed to be investi-
gated. A lot of the data sent over the internet needs to be somehow private and secure. 
This need has helped develop many advanced encryption techniques, SSH tunneling 
being one of the most popular methods today.  
Along with the development of increased secrecy come the techniques built to break 
these encryptions. The Logjam paper that raised awareness about the probable security 
issues of Diffie-Hellman key exchange was released on May 2015 [25]. The development 
of Nelix was already finished then, and during development the 1024bit Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange algorithm was thought to be practically unbreakable. This example demon-
strates how every developer has to stay with the newest trends and news in the industry. 
The current state of Nelix leaves a lot of room for improvement and new features. One 
key part of keeping the system secure was the requirements for Nelix not responding to 
inbound connections. This is proven possible with Nelix with its method of actively polling 
the server for new information and being able to retrieve it autonomously.  
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Bash Script key_upload.sh 
#!/bin/bash 
 
# Pasi Riissanen 2015 
# For Nelix, particle sensor project. 
# rsa key uploader to local server 
# Designed to be ran as a daemon. 
# Generates a new key pair and tries to upload it 
# until succesful. 
# All stdout outputs saved in /var/log/key_upload.log 
 
IP_ADDRESS=10.10.10.1 #Address of the local server 
LOG_ENTRY=/var/log/key_upload.log 
 
rm /var/log/key_upload.log 
echo "Log started at: " `date` >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 
#Remove older key pairs 
rm /home/user/.ssh/id* 
echo "Removed old key pairs" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 
#Create ssh keypair 
ssh-keygen -f /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa -t rsa -N ''  
echo "Identification saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
echo "Public key saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.pub" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 
#Find out eth0 HWaddr 
MAC_ADDRESS=`cat /sys/class/net/eth0/address` 
echo "This device has a mac address: $MAC_ADDRESS" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 
#Read public key from file id_rsa.pub 
PUB_KEY=$(</home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.pub) 
echo "Generated public key: $PUB_KEY" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 
#Test connection to local server 
#Loop until connection successful 
echo "Trying to connect to $IP_ADDRESS" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
while ! ping -c 1 $IP_ADDRESS; do echo "- timeout :(" >> $LOG_ENTRY; 
done; { 
 echo "$IP_ADDRESS responds to ping" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
 HTTP_RESPONSE_OK=200 
 CHECK_VALUE=0 
 while [ "$CHECK_VALUE" -ne "$HTTP_RESPONSE_OK" ] 
  do 
   echo "Sending public rsa key.." >> $LOG_ENTRY 
   CHECK_VALUE=`wget --spider -S "http://$IP_ADDRESS/in-
dex.php?key=$PUB_KEY" 2>&1 | grep "HTTP/" | awk '{print $2}'` 
   echo "HTTP returned: $CHECK_VALUE" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
  done 
 
 CHECK_VALUE=0 
 while [ "$CHECK_VALUE" -ne "$HTTP_RESPONSE_OK" ] 
  do 
   echo "Sending HWaddr.." >> $LOG_ENTRY 
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   CHECK_VALUE=`wget --spider -S "http://$IP_ADDRESS/in-
dex.php?mac=$MAC_ADDRESS" 2>&1 | grep "HTTP/" | awk '{print $2}'` 
   echo "HTTP returned: $CHECK_VALUE" >> $LOG_ENTRY 
  done    
} 
 
#Remove the cronjob that runs this script on boot 
#Must be ran as root :| 
crontab -l -u root | grep -v key_upload | crontab -u root  
